遼寧大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)前沿高端講座第九十講
On the merit principle in strategic exchange
主講人:曾華夏 副教授(上海財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué))
主持人:許睿 助理教授(遼寧大學(xué)中國經(jīng)濟(jì)研究院)
嘉賓介紹:周宇 副教授(遼寧大學(xué)中國經(jīng)濟(jì)研究院)
時間:2024年6月12日(周四)10:00-11:30(北京時間)
地點(diǎn):遼寧大學(xué)崇山校區(qū)五洲園一樓會議室
線上地址:騰訊會議846-7809-5157
語言:中文/英文
摘要:New fairness notions in align with the merit principle are proposed for designing exchange rules. We show that, for an obviously strategy-proof, efficient and individually rational rule, an upper bound of fairness attainable is that, if two agents possess objects considered the best by two equal groups, then at least one receives her favorite object. Notably, it is not possible to guarantee them both receiving favorites. Our results thus indicate an unambiguous trade-off between incentives and fairness in the design of exchange rules.
主講人簡介:
曾華夏,上海財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院副教授,本科畢業(yè)于復(fù)旦大學(xué),碩士畢業(yè)于廈門大學(xué)和新加坡管理大學(xué),獲得新加坡管理大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)博士,主要研究領(lǐng)域?yàn)槲⒂^經(jīng)濟(jì)理論和機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)。研究成果發(fā)表于Theoretical Economics, Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior和Journal of Mathematical Economics。擔(dān)任Econometrica, TE, JET, GEB和AEJ:Micro等十余本著名期刊的匿名評審。主持過一項(xiàng)國家自科青年基金。